Introduction
There is no universally accepted definition of a Regional Jet (hereafter, RJ) in the airline industry or in U.S. laws or regulation (General Accounting Office, 2001 , DOT, 1998 .
Whilst it is usually acknowledged that Airbus and Boeing aircraft are not considered RJs (MITRE, 2000 , Goold, 2001 , the broadest definition considers all jet aircraft under 100 seats as RJs (MITRE, 2000 1 ). This covers older aircraft such as the Fokker F.28 and British Aerospace 146 (Bernstein & Abbey, 1997) . However, the notional 'revolutionary' impact on the industry was brought on by the introduction of more modern RJs, notably Bombardier's Canadair Regional Jet. A more common definition in the industry is therefore 'jet aircraft put in service since 1993 designed to seat 100 or fewer passengers' and it is this that is used here. The GAO report adopts a definition similar to this and Appendix A provides a list of RJ models considered in this paper.
The impact of the RJs on domestic air transport in the United States (Delta Airlines, 2002 , RAA, 2001 , RAA, 2002 , Graham, 1997 , DOT, 1998 , Croft, 2002 ) is commonly referred to as a revolution. RJs have become a significant component of American air transport (Razzhivina, 2001 ) and airlines have adopted new strategies in order to exploit the unique characteristics of the aircraft whilst new patterns of air service have emerged (Vowles, 1999 , Bernstein & Abbey, 1997 . This growth reflects passenger preference (Dresner, 2002 , Pagiola, 2002 and operating characteristics and economics (Jaworoski, 2000 , DOT, 1998 , GAO, 2001 .
When the first RJ was delivered by Bombardier in 1992, the industry was pessimistic about its future (Fiorino, 2002) . However, in 1993, Comair introduced the first RJ service in the U.S. market (Sobie, 2002) and by 1996, there were under 100 RJs deployed in the country (RASI, 2003 , Higgins, 2001 .
By 1997 the industry as a whole began to adopt RJs (RAA, 2002) and 861 were in operation in America in 2002 (Delta Airlines, 2002 . The GAO (2001) reported that at January 2001, 1,255 RJs had been ordered and 1,010 were on option and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated 2,190 RJs by 2012 (Higgins, 2001 ) whereas Arnoult (2002a) predicts the figure to be 6,261 by 2020.
The RJ market has been identified as the fastest growing segment of the U.S. airline industry (Delta Airlines, 2002 , RAA, 2002 and although different sources report varying statistics on RJ deployment, often with discrepancies, nevertheless, all sources indicate rapid growth in the U.S. RJ fleet as shown in The most comprehensive prior study of RJ deployment is the General Accounting Office report (GAO, 2001 ). The report investigated the status of RJ deployment in the U.S. and how air service has subsequently evolved in broad terms from 1997 to 2001. Airline deployment strategy was also examined as well as RJs' impact on air traffic and congestion 2 . It shows that as of October 2000, major airlines provided regional jet service to 157 U.S. cities, only 13 (eight percent) of which were small cities with populations under 100,000. Larger cities (those with populations over 250,000) represented 74 percent (115) of the total U.S. cities receiving regional jet service. Most of this regional jet service has radiated from the carriers' hubs to spoke cities that the carriers were already serving with either 
Methodology
The five case study airports were chosen for their varied and contrasting characteristics, such that the impact of RJs on different airports could be compared. They were not chosen to represent the heaviest RJ use, nor to be representative; they were selected to illustrate a variety of perspectives, as is shown Delta heavily dominates the airport (Belobaba & Van Acker 1994) and has built up the biggest American RJ base there. RJ traffic feeds provide 14 points of Delta's load factor at the airport. With 350 daily RJ and 160 MJ departures, CVG is 'by far the most RJ-dependent hub' (Sobie, 2002) .
Cincinnati is favourably situated 'in the middle of the country', within RJ range of numerous 'little big cities' that are profitable markets for RJ operations (FAA, 1997) . The recent growth in traffic at the airport has allowed it to compete with other hubs nearby (FAA, 1997 (Sobie, 2002) .
LGA is also one of the most congested airports in the U.S. and slot restrictions limit access to the airport (Morrison & Winston, 1995 Only routes with at least one daily flight were considered because they are most indicative and representative of an airport's air service level.
Attention was also paid to code-shared flights such that they are not counted twice. The integrity of OAG data was assumed.
It is clearly the case that a study based on five case studies does not enable wide ranging statistically significant conclusions to be reached, but, nevertheless, the case study approach does allow significant situations and circumstances to be illustrated. It may, in turn, suggest the need for a more comprehensive study.
Results: Deployment at the Selected Airports
The first section of the results examines the number and growth of RJ routes; the share of routes served by RJs and the type of destination served.
The number and growth of RJ routes
Figure 3 summarises the number of RJ routes at the sample airports for the sample years. It includes all routes either exclusively or partially served by a RJ. RJs are examined a similar overall growth trend can be observed.
The proportion of RJ routes
Having shown the rapid increase in the number of routes on which RJs were deployed, the share of routes that were served in total by RJs was calculated for each airport. The results also shed light on industry fears that small communities would suffer as carriers turn to alljet fleets. While the fact that all of LNK's routes involved RJs may be a sign that RJs have pushed turboprops out, three-quarters of RJs routes were served by other aircraft along with RJs. This suggests that RJs could be deployed together with other aircraft types within a particular market rather than losing service.
The nature of RJ routes
Other than the quantity of RJ routes, it is also important to understand the nature of these routes. The size of all RJ route destinations was identified using FAA's definition of large, medium, small and non- Source: OAG Figure 5 shows that the types of routes on which RJs were deployed varied greatly between airports.
All RJ routes from the smaller airports had large hubs as destinations. Although this may be related to the nature of air service at the airport itself, it also suggests that carriers have not rushed to do hub bypassing with RJs. Since RJs continued to operate through hubs and given the rise in RJ numbers, the industry is rightly concerned with RJs' impact on airport congestion.
At the large airports, RJs were clearly used on a more diverse set of routes, even though medium/small airports represented the bulk of RJ destinations. The latter is consistent with the airlines' strategy of using RJs to add new spokes to their hubs. CVG had a large share of hub destinations whereas PHX's relatively high proportion of RJ routes to non-hub destinations may be related to its geographical location, with few large cities in the region suitable for RJ operation. It is also interesting to note that RJs were also used to serve large hub-large hub routes at congested LGA. The airport is capacity
constrained and yet small RJs are operated on high volume routes to maintain frequency. The data was disaggregated to reveal how the situation evolved from one period to another and this reveals a gradual diversification of RJ routes at the larger airports. In 1998, all RJ routes at PHX had small hubs as destinations. By 2002, all types of destinations were represented. Although less explicit, similar trends are found in LGA and even CVG. RJ deployment tended to initially focus on routes to small/medium-sized airports before extending to large and non-hubs.
Impact Of RJs on Air Service at the Selected Airports

The number of new routes
In this section, RJs impact on airports in terms of providing services to new markets is examined. For each sample year, new routes were identified from the list of all routes and the same was done for the list of RJ routes. A 'new route' was defined as a route operated in the year concerned but that was not (regardless of aircraft used) in the previous sample year. As a result, a 'new route' may be a route never operated before or an upgrade in service to the 'daily' level. Alternatively, a new route could also be one that was previously served indirectly but has become a non-stop service. The New York
LaGuardia -Birmingham, Alabama route, which included a stopover before 2000, is an example.
Reinstated routes, i.e. routes that were previously terminated but served again, were also considered as The cumulative percentage growth in total market number brought about by all-RJ new routes is examined in Figure 7 .
3 1996 is the first year for which new destinations are identified as the data collection began with 1994 data and this was treated as the base year. 4 AIR-21 gives RJ services special privileges in slot allocation In addition, some airports are more reliant on RJs for launching new routes. Figure 8 shows that all new routes at SAV were exclusively RJ markets while the figure was below 5 percent for PHX. RJs, then, played an important part in the growth of destination choice at SAV. Other aircraft have not been used to provide any new routes, not even along with RJs. One could expect that without RJs, the range of destinations available from SAV would be much more restricted.
More than 60 percent of markets in which RJs were deployed at SAV were all-RJ new markets.
Despite also establishing a significant number of new routes at CVG, the analysis revealed that LGA is a good example as all new markets being served exclusively by RJs were small hubs. This suggests that RJs were used on 'thin' routes and this is probably related to the AIR-21 initiative, which is designed to favour services to small communities.
Small airports' situation contrasted with that of their larger counterparts. All existing RJ routes from SAV and LNK were to large hubs and new destinations attributable to RJs were no different. So even in the development of new markets there is no evidence of hub bypassing, although it was not to be expected for such smaller/non-hub cities.
Having reviewed the size of new destinations linked up by RJs to the sample airports, it is possible to gauge how RJs have improved small airports' access to large hubs. This is important because small airports rely on connections through large hubs to access other parts of the air transport network.
Improved access to large hubs would mean significant benefits to travel options.
The number of large hub destinations in 1994 and 2002 were compared for LNK and SAV. Since RJs did not contribute to any new routes at LNK, RJs have had no impact on LNK's access to large hubs.
On the other hand, SAV had a total of ten large hub destinations in 2002 compared to six in 1994.
While one large hub route (Tampa) was dropped between 1994 and 1996, four were added using RJs exclusively and another with partial RJ service. RJs have therefore vastly improved the choice of large hub destinations available at SAV. From LNK and SAV's case studies, it appears that the impact of RJs has been more positive at small hubs than non-hubs. A gradual diversification of RJ routes could be observed at the larger airports. In 1998, all RJ routes at PHX had small hubs as destinations. By 2002, all types of destinations were represented. Although less explicit, similar trends are found in LGA and even CVG. RJ deployment tended to initially focus on routes to small/medium-sized airports before extending to large and non-hubs.
The nature of new routes -stage length
The Impact of RJs at Small Airports
In this section the impact on smaller airports is the focus. This enables a deeper insight to be gained on how RJs have affected small airports, to which RJs offered much hope of air service improvement.
How RJs have altered the overall condition of air service at LNK and SAV is discussed. The paper also sheds light on industry fears that the rise of RJs and all-jet fleets would threaten small community air service by pushing TBPs out of the market.
Route by Route analysis
Every route that has been operated from SAV and LNK during any of the sample years was analysed.
For each route, the number of daily flights and the equipment used were first examined. Aircraft used were grouped into three categories: turboprops, regional jets and mainline jets. Appendix B provides a list of aircraft observed in the study.
All routes with RJ service were also classified into groups similar to the GAO's RJ deployment categories. The routes' capacity and service frequency were then calculated. Capacity was computed by considering the typical seat capacity of the aircraft deployed on each frequency. Appendix B also
shows the typical seating capacity of the aircraft observed.
The number of airlines that operated the route and the subsequent shares of capacity and frequency were also worked out. Two techniques were used to measure carrier competition, as no single measure can describe market concentration in full (Belobaba & Van Acker, 1994) . The first is a count of total effective competitors in the market. This is used instead of a pure count of competitors because airlines with too small a share of the market would not be able to influence the level of competition.
For air transport markets, it is generally assumed that effective competitors have at least 5 percent of the market (Belobaba & Van Acker, 1994) . The second measure used is the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). The HHI reflects the assumption that larger airlines in a market have disproportionate market power by squaring each carrier's market share value. HHI values therefore range between 0 and 10,000. As a rule of thumb, HHI values above 1,800 indicate high levels of concentration (Belobaba & Van Acker, 1994 ). An inverse relationship between the two measures was expected.
Since schedule changes often occurred within a month and especially during the first two weeks, all analysis was conducted using flight data of the week from the 20 th to the 26 th . Code shared flights were counted as one and Trans World Airlines was considered as American Airlines throughout the analysis due to their later merger. The two carriers did not previously compete directly on routes used for this analysis. Table 1 and Table 2 list every route that has been operated at SAV and LNK during the period of study.
The period of operation, year by which RJs have been introduced and respective RJ deployment category are also shown. Table 1 Routes from SAV (Savannah Int'l Airport, Georgia) departures and one TBP departure with no change in frequency. This reflects the carriers' strategy to 'right-size' aircraft in an environment of reduced demand and evidence for this route is shown in Figure   10 . 
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In the case of LNK-Minneapolis, the introduction of RJs after 2000 added to the number of seats on offer, so here RJs were used as part of an expansion of capacity strategy. By contrast, LNK-Chicago shows the introduction of RJs as part of a continued effort to reduce capacity, albeit with a halt in the trend of falling frequency.
For SAV-Chicago the service was reinstated with RJs which shows that whereas with MJs the capacity required could not justify sufficient frequency for an attractive and viable service, with RJs, it could.
These highlighted cases show that the impact of RJs varied greatly. Depending on airline strategies and market conditions, RJs affected capacity and frequency levels in diverse ways. The flexibility in RJ usage meant that the introduction of RJs on a certain route had no standard impact. Nevertheless, the analysis has illustrated the spectrum of effects on market dynamics pertaining to the principal RJ deployment strategies.
While the impact on capacity and frequency varied from case to case, none of the routes analysed experienced change in market concentration. Competition between carriers that use RJs, did not occur at SAV or LNK. At least in the small airport context, the use of RJs was not generally associated with airlines entering rival markets. So how did the RJ gain the title of 'saviour of airline competition'?
The Case of SAV
In order to determine whether network competition has indeed increased with the introduction of RJs, the market concentration measures were applied at the airport level. This was only done for SAV as SAV received many new or reinstated routes served exclusively by RJs whereas there were no new routes at LNK. This suggests that network competition may have been enhanced at SAV, depending on which carrier operated the routes. Figure 11 shows the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, the cumulative number of routes provided exclusively by RJs and the number of effective competitors. Northwests' shares of capacity at SAV were only 4.11 percent and 3.33 percent respectively.
It is also interesting to note that despite the large number of new routes between 1998 and 2000, the HHI value continued to rise. This suggests that other than new entrants, incumbent airlines at SAV were also using RJs to add new destinations. Closer examination did reveal that during the same period, Delta Airlines, which had the greatest share of capacity, has maintained and even strengthened its position by using RJs to launch new routes too. These include Cincinnati, Dallas/Fort Worth and New York LaGuardia. As from 1998, Delta held more than 50 percent of SAV's seating capacity.
Using RJs to add new routes, then, was as much a defensive strategy as an offensive one. Figure 13 shows the results for market concentration in terms of service frequency. At LNK, RJs supplemented other aircraft in existing markets. There was an array of effects on capacity and frequency levels, which varied enormously between deployment strategies. At SAV, RJs were used for launching new routes or reinstating discontinued services. For both airports, RJ deployment did not lead to increased carrier competition in individual markets. Probably the most positive impact in terms of competition is that thanks to new routes attributable to RJs, the number of airlines operating out of SAV has increased, thus improving passenger choice over airline networks.
However, this was not observed at LNK, where RJ deployment did not translate into new routes.
SAV and LNKs' diverging results showed that it is impossible to ascertain RJs' impact on air service by considering deployment numbers alone. The effects of RJ deployment could vary greatly from route to route, let alone at different airports.
Other literature in this area suggests that since RJs' operating cost for short flights is unfavourable, that there are concerns over small community air service as TBPs give way to all-jet fleets. Continental
Airlines has indicated that some smaller markets may lose air service once TBPs are retired (Arnoult, 2002b , DOT, 1998 , De Lollis & Hansen, 2002 . New RJ services to nearby medium sized cities may also draw passengers away from small airports, worsening the problem (Vowles, 1999) . However, in 1998, the Department of Transport (DOT) found that RJs' negative impact on small communities was 'minimal' (DOT, 1998) but Mesa Airlines described the situation with small markets traditionally served by 19-seat turboprops as ' a crisis' and 'disastrous' as late as August 2001 (Marks, 2001 ).
Conclusions
The study aimed to investigate the impact of regional jets from the airport and market perspectives.
From case studies of the five sample airports, findings from previous studies were verified and new ones suggested.
The topic was approached from a number of angles. First, the general deployment status of RJs at the sample airports was surveyed. In the final part of the analysis, RJs' effects on individual markets and carrier competition were examined in the small airport context. The impact of RJs' on markets dynamics was found to be as varied as the different RJ deployment categories. As RJs were flexibly used to replace or supplement other aircraft types, a spectrum of effects on route capacity and frequency could be observed. While
RJs were championed as 'saviour[s] of airline competition ' (MITRE, 2000) , the study found that the introduction of RJs did not alter the level of market concentration at the individual route level at either LNK or SAV. However, RJs did enhance network competition at SAV. But as incumbents also capitalised on opportunities offered by RJs, the overall market share of new entrants remained insignificant. The analysis also investigated industry concerns that RJs would spell the end to many TBP routes. Some evidence of this was found at both LNK and SAV but the study could not be conclusive. Lastly, even as LNK and SAVs' experiences with RJs were fundamentally different, personal interviews with senior airport staff revealed that both airports viewed RJs very positively.
This paper has revealed that numerous deployment strategies were employed. RJs were used on their own as well as for supplementing or replacing other equipment. They were instruments for launching new routes, increasing frequency while maintaining capacity and vice versa. RJs' versatility translated into a spectrum of effects on air service, some more prominent than others at any given airport.
Even if airlines' enthusiasm over RJs' original and unique capabilities are justified, airports should not be too swift to share the excitement. Although some airports, such as Savannah, have undoubtedly reaped benefits from the advent of RJs, others -and perhaps the majority -have seen little impact. In the brouhaha over RJs' seemingly omnipotence in improving air service at small communities, Lincoln's case proved revealing. Indeed, service frequency has increased but at the expense of capacity. Basic economics (e.g. low demand) and the very nature of the airport (e.g. location)
continued to inhibit new routes, in spite of RJs. Their invention has not altered the fundamental requirements for viable operation.
last decade, its limitations as well as abilities should be recognised. As the hype over RJs continues, it is worthwhile realising that, so far, the 'revolution' has only come to particular airports, certainly not all and the aggregate picture described by the industry and government is in fact a combination of highly dissimilar cases. This could be more firmly established with a greater number of case study airports.
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